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RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF LAW-A PROBLEM
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Edward S. Stimson*

M

AY an overruling decision be applied to ascertain the legal effect
of prior conduct? In cases arising under the diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
federal courts should apply earlier state court decisions, and not a
decision overruling them, whenever the retroactive application of the
new rule would adversely affect a party who had changed his position
in reliance on the decisions overruled. 1 In the absence of such reliance
and change of position it has sustained the retroactive application of a
new rule. 2 If the basis of the first principle is elemental fairness and

*

Dean, College of Law, University of Toledo. A.B., B.Sc., A.M., Ohio State;
J.D., S.J.D., Michigan; Author, JURISDICTION AND PowER OF TAXATION (1933),
CONFLICT OF CRIMINAL LAWS (1936), and numerous articles in legal periodicals-Ed.
1
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, l Wall. (68 U. S.) 175 (1863); Havemeyer v.
Iowa County, 3 Wall. (70 U. S.) 294 (1865); Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. (83
U. S.) 678 (1872); Douglass v. County of Pike, IOI U. S. 677 (1879); County of
Ralls v. Douglass, 105 U. S. 728 (1881); Green County v. Conness, 109 U. S.
104, 3 S. Ct. 69 (1883). Cf. Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Martin, 268
U.S. 458, 45-S. Ct. 543 (1925); Anderson v. Santa Anna, II6 U. S. 356, 6 S. Ct.
413 (1886). In Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, supra, Justice Swayne said, at p. 206:
"However we may regard the late case in Iowa as affecting the future, it can have no
effect upon the past•••. To hold otherwise would be as unjust as to hold that rights
acquired under a statute may be lost by its repeal." In Olcott v. Supervisors, supra,
Strong, J., said, at p. 690: "This court has always ruled that if a contract when made
was valid under the constitution and laws of a State, as they had been previously
expounded by its judicial tribunals, and as they were understood at the time, no ~ubsequent action by the legislature or the judiciary will be regarded by this court as
establishing its invalidity. Such a rule is based upon the highest principles of justice."
In Douglass v. County of Pike, supra, Waite, C. J., said, at p. 687: "We recognize fully
not only the right of a state court, but its duty to change its decisions whenever, in its
judgment, the necessity arises. It may do this for new reasons, or because of a change
of opinion in respect to old ones; and ordinarily we will follow them, except so far as
they affect rights vested before the change was made."
In Stimson, "Swift v. Tyson-What Remains?" 24 CoRN. L. Q. 54 at 77
(1938), the writer takes the position that the doctrine of the Gelpcke case has not been
invalidated by the recent decision in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct.
817 (1938).
2
Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 357 (1873); Baltimore &
Ohio R. R. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 13 S. Ct. 914 (1893); Liverpool & Great
Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Insurance Co., 12() U. S. 397, 9 S. Ct. 469 (1888);
Stimson, "Swift v. Tyson-What Remains?" 24 CoRN. L. Q. 54 at 70-73 (1938).
Contra, Bucher v. Chesire R.R., 125 U.S. 555, 8 S. Ct. 974 (1887).
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justice it might be supposed that the due process clauses would require
it, since they a:fford protection against arbitrariness or unfairness either
procedural or substantive. It might be supposed further that the same
would be true of statutes. While statutes are not applied retroactively
unless Congress or legislature so provides either expressly or by implication,3 the question raised here is the extent to which such provisions
are constitutionally valid. The decisions of the United States Supreme
Court have been examined for the purpose of ascertaining the extent
to which the United States Constitution is a bar to the retroactive application of law, either judge-made or statutory:'8 The cases are collected in Smead, "The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation:
A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence," 20 M1NN. L. REv. 775 at 778, 781, notes IO,
22 (1936).
4
The application of the contract clause of Article I, § 10, to prevent the retroactive application of a statute or overruling decision to contract rights acquired in
reliance on existing law is not considered in this article. There are several reasons for
this. In the first place the contract clause was first rejected by the Convention on the
ground that there was no reason why contract rights should be singled out from all other
vested rights, such as rights and titles to land and chattels, and given special protection.
2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CoNvENTION OF 1787, p. 439 (19u). Apparently the clause was slipped in later by the Committee on Form and Style. 2 ibid., p.
597. [But see 2 ibid., pp. 619, 636; 3 ibid., pp. 100, 214 indicating later discussion
on this phrase.]
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not available to protect vested rights other than contract rights until 1868. During the period from the
adoption of the Constitution to 1868 the Supreme Court seems to have used the
contract clause to protect all vested rights, including right and titles to land and
chattels, on the ground that they all grew out of contract. After 1868 the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment performs this service. The contract clause gives
no greater protection to contract rights than the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment gives to all rights. It does not protect against interference with the making
of future contracts. Only vested rights under contracts already made are protected.
These rights are protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The contract clause is bound to become the veriform appendix of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has held that the retroactive application of law to vested
contract rights acquired in reliance on existing law is prohibited by the contract clause.
Hawthorne v. Cale£, 2 Wall. (69 U.S.) IO (1864). In spite of the Fourteenth Amendment it continues to interpret "contract" very broadly. Coombes v. Goetz, 284 U. S.
434, 52 S. Ct. 199 (1932). See Kauper, "What is a 'Contract' under the Contracts
Clause of the Federal Constitution?" 31 M1cH. L. REv. 187 (1932).
In view of all this it seems impossible to consider the protection which the
contract clause affords against the retroactive application of law to contract rights
acquired in reliance on existing law without considering the other problems arising
under the contract clause. This would extend the article beyond its scope unduly and
since no greater protection is afforded than that afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment it has seemed best to omit a detailed examination of the cases under the contract
clause.
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I
THE

Ex PosT FACTO CLAUSE 5

From its wording, "No state shall .•. pass any ..• ex post facto
law," 6 the clause might be supposed to forbid the states from applying
any law retroactively.1 This is not true. In Calder v. Bull 8 the United
States Supreme Court held that ex post facto was a technical term
limited to criminal law so that the section prohibited retroactive criminal laws and not all retroactive laws. The Court, in reaching its conclusion, relied upon the fact that similar provisions in a number of
state constitutions at the time the Constitution was adopted were so
worded as to make it clear that they referred to criminal laws only.
It also thought that retroactive laws might in some instances be proper
or necessary so that the Constitutional Convention could hardly have
intended to prohibit all retroactive laws. Some retroactive laws are
curative and beneficial. This was true of the state statute in Wilkinson
v. Leland,9 and it is indeed fortunate that Justice Johnson's view that
the term ex post facto was general and applied to all law 10 did not
prevail.
In Ross v. Oregon 11 the word "law" in the ex post facto clause was
held to mean statute law and not judge-made law. Since the word
"pass" is used in the clause, it is difficult to see how any other conclusion could be reached. The clause was held not to apply to a decision of
the high court of a state which gave a construction that could hardly
have been foreseen to a statute of the state enacted before the occurrence
of the conduct to which it was applied. The retroactive application of
the novel construction would seem to be as unfair and unjust as the
retroactive application of a statute, but the evil is not prohibited by this
6
See Field, "Ex Post Facto in the Constitution," 20 M1cH. L. REV. 3 I 5 ( I 922);
McAllister, "Ex Post Facto Laws in the Supreme Court of the United States," I 5
CAL. L. REV. 269 (1927).
6
Art. I, § 10.
1 That this may have been the meaning intended by the Constitutional Convention, see Field, "Ex Post Facto in the Constitution," 20 M1cH. L. REv. 3 15 ( 1922).
To the writer the evidence which Mr. Field assembles from the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention is inconclusive.
8
3 Dall. (3 U. S.) 386 (1798). Accord: Locke v. New Orleans, 4 Wall. (71
U. S.) 172 (1866); Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 31 S. Ct. 171
(1910).
9
2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 627 (1829).
10
A note by Justice Johnson on the exposition of the phrase "ex post facto" in
the Constitution of the United States appears in 2 Pet. (27 U. S.). In some editions
this is at p. 415 and in others in the Appendix, note 1, p. 681.
11
227 U. S. 150, 33 S. Ct. 220 (1913).
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constitutional provision. However, it would seem that it should be prohibited by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in cases
where the accused could reasonably have put a different construction
upon the statute.12

II
THE DuE PRocEss CLAUSES

A. Retroactive Statutes 18
1. Decisions Holding Retroactive Statutes Unconstitutional
In two cases decided in 1913 u the United States Supreme Court
held that retroactive statutes were contrary to the due process clauses
of the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. InEttorv. City of Tacoma 11
a statute of the state of Washington gave owners of property a right to
consequential damages against the city for injury resulting from change
in grade. The grade of the street in front of Ettor's property was
changed while this statute was in force. While Ettor's suit against the
city of Tacoma was pending, the legislature of Washington repealed
the statute. The Washington courts ruled that the repealer applied
retroactively to cut off Ettor's right to damages because the statute
contained no saving clause. The United States Supreme Court held that
the retroactive application of the statute deprived Ettor of his property
without due process of law and was prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
In Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales 16 an order of the military
governor of Porto Rico reduced from thirty years to six the period
which must elapse between the two ex parte proceedings necessary
to secure title to land. It was applied to a case where more than six
years had elapsed at the time the order was promulgated so as suddenly
See the discussion of the due process clauses, infra. But see Patterson v. Colorado
ex rel. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454, 27 S. Ct. 556 (1907). Cf. O'Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 242 U. S. 20, 37 S. Ct. 7 (1916).
18 See Smith, "Retroactive Income Taxation," 33 YALE L. J. 35 (1923);
Amberg, "Retroactive Excise Taxation," 37 HARv. L. REv. 691 (1924); Smith,
"Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights," 5 TEX. L. REV. 2 31 {l 92 7) ; Ballard, "Retroactive Federal Taxation," 4-8 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1935); Neuhoff, "Retrospective
Tax Laws," 21 ST. Louis L. REV. l (1935); Lowenhaupt, "The Power of Congress
to Impose Excise Taxes Retrospectively," 21 ST. Louis L. REV. 109 (1936); Smead,
"The Rule Against Retroactive Legislation: A Basic Principle of Jurisprudence," 20
M1NN. L. REV. 775 (1936); Seeman, "The Retroactive Effect of Repeal Legislation,"
27 KY. L. J. 75 (1938).
H There are dicta in earlier decisions. Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall (84 U. S.)
596 (1873); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 at 199, 21 S. Ct. 743 (1900).
15
228 U.S. 148, 33 S. Ct. 428 (1913).
16
230 U.S. 139, 33 S. Ct. 1033 (1913).
12

34
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to deprive the owner of his title without _an opportunity to present his
claim. The United States Supreme Court held that this retroactive
application of the order was prohibited by the Fifth Amendment because it deprived the owner of his property without due process of
law. A purchaser from the party who brought the ex parte proceedings
under the order was held to have taken with notice of the retroactive
character of the order and the invalidity of the proceedings under it.
Several other cases have applied the same principle. In Forbes
Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners of Everglades Drainage
District 11 the Forbes Line sent boats through the drainage district's
canal and lock before tolls were :fixed by the Florida legislature. Tolls
were collected for passage through the lock which the Forbes Line
paid under protest. It sued to get them back. The commissioners then
pleaded the statute and plaintiff demurred to the plea on the ground
that the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I,
section IO of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court of
Florida gave judgment for the commissioners. The United States
Supreme _Court reversed the judgment, again holding that the retroactive application of the statute was prohibited by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nichols v. Coolidge 18 was a case in which the settlor conveyed
property in 1907 to trustees in trust to divide it among her children
when she died. In 1919 Congress enacted an estate tax law which in
terms applied to property "of which the decedent has at any time made
a transfer, or with respect to which he has at any time created a trust,
in contemplation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death ( whether such transfer or trust is made or
created before or after the passage of this act) ...." 19 On the death of
the settlor in 1921 the statute was applied to subject the trust property
to the tax. The United States Supreme Court held that its application
to conveyances made before it was enacted was retroactive and prohibited by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, because
arbitrary, capricious and conhscatory.20
17

258 U.S. 338, 42 S. Ct. 325 (1921).
274 U.S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927).
19
Revenue Act of 1919, § 402 (c), 40 Stat. L. 1097.
20 The application of the statute in Nichols v. Coolidge was retroactive only if
the Court's theory that the tax was a tax upon the owner's act in transferring his property is sound. The tax is not one which is imposed because of any act on the part of
the owner. If he does nothing the property passes by intestate succession subject to the
tax. Death is not an act of the owner. It is an event. The tax, then, is upon property on
the happening of an event. In Nichols v. Coolidge it was referred to as an "excise" tax,
It was called that in Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 78-83, 20 S. Ct. 747 (1900),
18
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The doctrine of Nichols v. Coolidge has been applied to gifts made
only a short time before enactment of the statute. In Blodgett v.
Holden, 21 the statute was enacted June 2, 1924. It had first been considered in Congress February 25, 1924. The Supreme Court divided
four to four on the question certified by the circuit court of appea~s
whether the Fifth Amendment prohibited the application of the statute
to gifts made in January, 1924.22 Nevertheless in Untermeyer v. Anwhen the Supreme Court decided that an estate tax was not a direct tax and so was
not required by the Constitution to be apportioned among the states in proportion
to population. The term "excise" is not one which is used with precision. It is clear
that as used in these cases it is not limited to a tax !Jpon a person or his property,
because of some act done by him. In Knowlton v. Moore it was admitted that the tax
was a tax upon property upon the happening of an event. The ground of that decision
was that the term "direct taxes" in article I, § 9, clause 4, in so far as it referred to
taxes upon property, meant taxes imposed upon property solely because of its ownership and not taxes imposed upon it on the death of the owner since this was the view
at the time that the Constitution was adopted.
If the tax is a tax on property, it would seem not to be taking propery without
due process of law to impose it on the beneficiary's coming into possession or enjoyment
after enactment of the statute. So conceived, the law was not applied retroactively in
Nichols v. Coolidge. Classification of property to which the beneficiary succeeds in
possession or enjoyment on the death of the owner with decedent's estates would seem
not to be unreasonable. This result was reached in Milliken v. United States, 283
U.S. 15, 51 S. Ct. 324 (1931), where the transfer was made after the 1916 estate
tax law was in force but before enactment of the 19 I 8 act. The 19 I 8 statute imposed
higher rates than the 1916 act. The Supreme Court held that the application of the
1918 rates to this transfer on the death of the transferor in 1920 was not prohibited
by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, because the transferor knew that
it would be subject to the tax on his death and that the rates might be higher than
they were at the time of the transfer. In this case the Court unwittingly regards the tax
as a tax on the property which the transferor must know will subsequently be subject
to taxation and not as a tax upon the transferor's act imposed retroactively after it was
done. The same view was taken in Phillips v. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 284 U.S.
160, 52 S. Ct. 46 (1931), as to tenancies by the entirety created after the 1916 act
but before the 1918 law.
If the tax is regarded as a tax upon the beneficiary's right to gain possession and
enjoyment of the property, its application to transfers made before enactment of the
statute and intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment on the death of the
transferor would not be retroactive when the coming into possession or enjoyment was
after the statute. Yet in Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 51 S. Ct. 306 (1931), the
contrary was decided. The Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited the application of a Massachusetts statute which went into effect September
1, 1907 to a transfer made before that date, when the coming into possession and enjoyment was after that date. Four justices dissented, on the ground that the theory
of the Massachusetts law, as with most state inheritance tax laws, was that it was a tax
upon the beneficiary's right to receive the property.
21
275 U. S. 142, 48 S. Ct. 105 (1927), modified 276 U. S. 594, 48 S. Ct.
105 (1928).
22
See modifying opinion, 276 U. S. 594, 48 S. Ct. ro:; (1928).
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derson,28 the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment prohibited
the application of the statute to transfers made while Congress was
considering the measure. In Coolidge v. Long,2 ¼ application of a Massachusetts statute enacted June 27, 1907 to take effect September 1, 1907
to a transfer made between those dates was held contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Sound Decisions Sustaining Retroactive Statutes
In Gross v. United States Mortgage Co.,25 one Lombard, who
owned land in Illinois, borrowed $50,000 from the United States
Mortgage Company, a foreign corporation, and gave it a mortgage on
his land to secure the loan. The money was used to construct a building on the land. Lombard then sold the property to the National Life
Insurance Company for $rno,173. The insurance company agreed to
assume and pay the mortgage and the agreement was accepted in part
payment of the purchase price for the amount of the mortgage. It
also gave in part payment of the purchase price its promissory note
for $12,273 secured by a trust deed of the property. Thereafter, Gross
purchased the note and trust deed. The Supreme Court of Illinois
held that at the times of these transactions a foreign corporation could
not acquire a mortgage interest in Illinois land and that therefore the
mortgage was void. 26 After these transactions the Illinois legislature
enacted a statute permitting foreign corporations to hold mortgages on
Illinois land; the Supreme Court of Illinois construed it to apply
retroactively to validate the mortgage. The insurance company went
into bankruptcy and Lombard defaulted in payments on the mortgage.
Gross claimed that, since the mortgage was void, the trust deed was a
first lien on the property so that he was entitled to receive the proceeds
of a part of the land taken by the city in condemnation proceedings.
He claimed that the retroactive application of the statute to validate
the mortgage and give the proceeds of the condemnation to the mortgage company deprived him of his property without due process of
law contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States
Supreme Court held that he was not deprived of property because he
2.

28

276 U.S. 440, 48 S. Ct. 353 (1928).
282 U.S. 582, 51 S. Ct. 306 (1931).
28
108 U.S. 477, 2 S. Ct. 940 (1883).
211
Before the case came to the United States Supreme Court the Supreme Court
of Illinois had in other cases overruled this decision, but the United States Supreme
Court did not decide whether the overruling decisions could be applied retroactively
in this case. It assumed that the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case
before it was correct in order to consider the constitutional question.
2¼
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took with notice of and subject to Lombard's equitable lien for the
purchase price, which the statute applied to the payment of Lombard's
indebtedness to the mortgage company.
In City of Seattle v. Kelleher 21 a street improvement was made
which went through land whose owner had joined in the request for
it. An assessment was made which was invalid. The owner then sold the
land to Kelleher. Subsequently there was a new assessment which
imposed a burden on the property ten per cent greater than that imposed by the invalid assessment. The United States Supreme Court
held that the retroactive application of the assessment to Kelleher's
land was not a deprivation of property without due process of law
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. It said that an assessment
could be made for an executed consideration, that Kelleher could not
have purchased without noticing the improvement, and that he had a
duty to inquire as to whether or not it had been paid for.
In United States v. Heinszen & Co. 28 duties were collected on
goods imported into the Philippine Islands from the United States
pursuant to an order of the President of the United States issued after
the islands had been acquired from Spain. These duties were collected
from all according to a previously announced schedule of rates and were
paid without protest. It was then discovered that the President did not
have authority to issue the order, as the matter was within the province
of Congress. Heinszen & Co. brought suit to recover duties paid before
the statute was passed. While the suit was pending Congress enacted a
statute validating the collections. The court of claims applied the statute
and dismissed the suit. Heinszen & Co. claimed that the retroactive
application of the statute to validate the collections deprived it of
property without due process of law contrary to the Fifth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court held that there was no denial of
due process, saying that the statute was a ratification of prior acts done
in the name of the government.
3. Rationale
The common characteristic of the cases holding the retroactive
application of a statute contrary to due process of law is the element
of surprise. A person who has changed his position, omitted to change it,
or made commitments in reliance upon the law in force at the time is
27
195 U. S. 351, 25 S. Ct. 44 (1904). Accord: Phillip Wagner, Inc. v. Leser,
239 U.S. 207, 36 S. Ct. 66 (1915). Cf. Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. (70 U.S.)
327 (1865).
28
206 U. S. 370, 27 S. Ct. 742 (1907).
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suddenly confronted with a change in the law applicable to his prior
conduct, resulting in a liability or loss. of investment which he has no
opportunity to anticipate and avoid. On the other hand, in the cases
holding the retroactive application of a statute consistent with due
process of law, the element of surprise is lacking. There has been no
change of position, omission to chapge or commitment in reliance upon
the law in force at the time.
In the Forbes case,29 where the retroactive application of the statute
was held unconstitutional, the boat line sent its boats through the canal
and lock relying on the lack of legislation imposing tolls. That they
did so rely is shown by the fact that the charges illegally imposed were
paid under protest. It cannot be said in this case that they received
benefits at their request for which payment is ordinarily expected,3°
as in the case of the street improvements in City of Seattle 'ti. Kelleher 81
where there was a contrary conclusion. The use of canals and locks,
like the use of highways, is frequently furnished free of charge. In
United States 'ti. Heinszen & Co.,32 where the retroactive application
of the statute was sustained, there was no reliance on the law as it
existed at the time Philippine import tariffs were paid because they
were paid without protest. 33 The real basis for distinguishing the Forbes
and H einszen cases is the protest at the time of payment in one and
the lack of it in the other. The maxim that ratification relates back,
which the Court relied upon in the H einszen case, has been demonstrated to be unsound.34 It would be equally applicable to the Forbes
case.
29
Forbes Pioneer Boat Line v. Board of Commissioners of Everglades Drainage
District, 258 U.S. 338, 42 S. Ct. 325 (1921), discussed supra at note 17.
30
Justice Holmes said: "It would seem from the first decision of the Court
below that the transaction was not one for which payment naturally could have been
expected. To say that the legislature simply was establishing the situation as both
parties knew from the beginning it ought to be would be putting something of a gloss
upon the facts. We must assume that the plaintiff went through the canal relying upon
its legal rights and it is not to be deprived of them because the legislature forgot."
258 U. S. 338 at 340.
81
195 U.S. 351, 25 S. Ct. 44 (1904), discussed supra at note 27.
32
206 U. S. 370, 27 S. Ct. 472 (1907), discussed supra at note 28.
33
ln Charlotte Harbor & N. Ry. v. Welles, 260 U.S. 8, 43 S. Ct. 3 (1922),
the action was to enjoin an assessment before the tax was paid. While the action was
pending the Florida legislature passed a statute validating the illegal assessment. The
Supreme Court of the United States held that the retroacti,,e application of the statute
was not contrary to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, citing United
States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U. S. 370, 27 S. Ct. 472 (1907). It is clear that
in this case there was no change of position in reliance on the illegality of the assessment.
34
Wambaugh, "A Problem as to Ratification," 9 HARV. L. REv. 60 (1895);
I MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., §§ 508-523 (1914).
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In Graham & Foster 'V. Goodcell 8 ~ the Court had a case in which
the facts were similar to those in the Forbes and Heinszen cases. It
was obliged to decide which authority applied. Additional income taxes
were assessed on a return filed March 22, 1918. The taxpayers filed a
claim for abatement of the taxes, and the collector allowed the fiveyear statute of limitations to run under the mistaken belief that it did
not apply to claims for unpaid taxes when pleas for abatement had been
filed and were under consideration. After the claim was barred by the
statute of limitations, the collector demanded payment, the taxes were
paid under protest and a claim for refund filed. The taxpayers' claim
for refund was rejected and they brought suit to recover the money
paid. While the suit was pending Congress enacted a statute prohibiting the repayment of such taxes. The United States Supreme Court
held that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the retroactive repeal of the statute 0f limitations in this class
of cases, applying the Heinszen case and refusing to apply the Forbes
case. In the H einszen case no protest was made when the tariff was
paid, while in this case and in the Forbes case the taxes were paid under
protest. The case is more like the Forbes case in that the taxpayers
were clearly relying on the law in force at the time the tax was paid.
It is not so clear that so relying they changed their position, as they did
no act such as the sending of boats through the canal and lock in the
Forbes case. The case is one of the retroactive imposition of a tax on
income of prior years like the income tax cases subsequently considered.
In United States 'V. Heinszen & Co.,36 Graham and Foster 'V.
Goodcell, 31 and Charlotte Harbor & Northern Ry. 'V. Welles, 38 the
taxpayer brought his action before the statute was enacted validating
the collection or assessment. These cases raise the question whether
incurring liability for costs and attorney's fees by bringing suit should
be considered such a change of position in reliance on existing law as
to make the retroactive application of a curative law a violation of due
process. In all three the United States Supreme Court held the retroactive application of the statute not contrary to due process. This seems
sound. If the mere bringing of a suit would be a bar to curative legislation it would be too easy to hamper the operations of the government,811
282 u. s. 409, 51 s. Ct. 186 (1930).
206 U.S. 370, 27 S. Ct. 742 (1907), discussed supra at note 28.
87
28 2 U. S. 409, 5 l S. Ct. l 86 ( l 930), discussed supra at note3 5.
88
260 U.S. 8, 43 S. Ct. 3 (1922), discussed in note 33, supra.
39
"With respect to the effect of the act of Congress upon existing causes of action,
the Court observed that 'the mere commencement of the suit did not change the nature
of the right' or 'operate to deprive the government of the power to enact curative
SG
36
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In Ochoa v. Hernandez y Morales,4° where the retroactive application of the law was held contrary to due process, the owner of land in
Porto Rico still had many years in which to bring an action to oust
one who had established presumptive right to possession by ex parte
proceedings. Relying upon this he did not bring the action. Suddenly
and without notice the order of the military governor and the ex parte
proceedings under it deprived him of his right to bring the action and
title to the land. If the order is regarded as imposing a loss on the owner
because of his prior conduct in not bringing an action, it was given a
retroactive application. In so conducting himself the owner was relying
upon the law as it was at the time of his conduct. If the order and the
ex parte proceedings under it be looked upon as a transfer of the owner's
title to the party bringing the ex parte proceedings it would not be
retroactive. Nevertheless it would not be consistent with due process of
law because done without notice and hearing. The public interest in
securing property against arbitrary action is superior to the public
good which the order was intended to accomplish. In so far as the
order applied to properties upon which the statutory period had already
run, it was not justifiable under the police power.
Ettor v. Tacoma,41 where the- retroactive application of the statute
was held contrary to due process of law, is not easy to explain. At the
time the grade was changed in front of Ettor's property a statute in
force afforded him a right to damages. The subsequent repeal of this
statute was applied to cut off this right. It was applied retroactively to
determine the legal effect of acts done before the statute was enacted.
However, it is not at all clear that Ettor changed his position in reliance
upon the statute. The incurring of costs and attorney's fees by bringing
suit would not be a change of position in reliance on existing law sufficient to bring the due process clause into play/2 It may be that he
refrained from taking action to oppose the improvement relying upon
the statute. He may have made expenditures for improvements or for
other purposes relying upon the damages afforded by the statute.
There is, however, no evidence in the case to support these conjectures.
Nevertheless such conduct is possible and so usual that it would seem
that it should be presumed, that is, the burden of proving that there
statutes, which, if the actions had not been brought, would have been unquestionably
valid.'" Chief Justice Hughes in Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409 at 428,
51 S. Ct. 186 (1930), quoting from United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U. S.
370 at 387, 27 S. Ct. 472 (1907).
40
230 U.S. 139, 33 S. Ct. 1033 (1913), discussed supra at note 16.
41
228 U.S. 148, 33 S. Ct. 428 (1913), discussed supra at note I 5.
42
See supra, page 39.
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was no change of position in reliance on existing law should be upon
the city. If the repeal is regarded as not retroactive but merely a present
taking of property which is conferred upon the city, it would be contrary to due process of law. Its object would not be justifiable under
the police power. It would be taking private property for a public use
without compensation. This would be no less true if the right was
divested retroactively.
In Nichols v. Coolidge 43 and subsequent inheritance tax cases in
which it was applied, the Court seems to have been mistaken in supposing that the statute was applied retroactively.44
In Gross v. United States Mortgage Co.,45 where the retroactive
application of the statute was sustained, Gross did not in any way change
or omit to change his position in reliance upon the invalidity of the
mortgage under the law as it then existed, since his equity under the
trust·deed was inferior to a vendor's lien, for the same amount, of which
he had notice.

4. Unsound Decisions Sustaining Retroactive Statutes
There are a number of United States Supreme Court decisions prior
to 1913 48 and one in 1914 47 sustaining the retroactive application of
statutes. In the opinions in these cases it is made the ground of the
decision or assumed that there is nothing in the due process clauses
of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment to prohibit the
retroactive application of statutes.
a. Stockdale v. The Insurance Companies 48
This is a case in which Congress on July 14, 1870 enacted an income
tax law extending prior income tax laws which had expired. As applied
in the Stockdale case, it subjected income earned in 1869 and in 1870
prior to July 14 to a tax. Thus it was retroactive. The statute provided
that the prior statutes "shall be construed to impose the taxes therein
mentioned to the first day of August 1870." The questions considered
were the meaning of the statute and whether construction of the prior
statutes was the province of Congress or the courts. The Court sus41

274 U. S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927), discussed supra at note 18.
See discussion in note 20, supra.
45
rn8 U. S. 477, 2 S. Ct. 940 (1883), discussed supra at note 25.
4
t1 Stockdale v. The Insurance Companies, 20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 323 (1873);
League v. Texas, 184 U. S. 156, 22 S. Ct. 475 (1902); Citizens Nat. Bank T, Kentucky, 217 U. S. 443, 30 S. Ct. 532 (19m).
41
Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 261, 34 S. Ct. 421 (1914).
411
20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 323 (1873).
44
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tained the tax. Three justices dissented, differing with the majority
on the construction of the statute. The question of the validity of the
retroactive imposition of the tax under the due process clause of the
Fifth Amendment was not raised or argued. The Court did not mention
the Amendment. The only bearing of the case upon the problem we
are considering here is a dictum by Justice Miller whose opinion represented the views of four of the justices. He said:
"The right of Congress to have imposed this tax by a new
statute, although the measure of it was governed by the income
.of the past year, cannot be doubted; much less can it be doubted
that it could impose such a tax on the income of the current year,
though part of that year had elapsed when the statute was passed.
The joint resolution of July 4th, 1864, imposed a tax of five per
cent upon all income of the previous year, although one tax on it
had already been paid, and no one doubted the validity of the tax
or attempted to resist it.
"Both in principle and authority it may be taken to be established, that a legislative body may by statute declare the construction of previous statutes so as to bind the courts in reference to all
transactions occurring after the passage of the law, and may in
many cases thus furnish the rule to govern the courts in transactions which are past, provided no constitutional right of the party
concerned is violated." 49
The reasoning in this dictum d9es not commend itself. In cases
involving jurisdiction to tax, the Supreme Court has held taxes invalid
under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
ground that they reached property beyond the jurisqiction of the state,
refusing to be swayed by the argument that the tax was only measured
by such property.50 Also an issue is not finally disposed of by saying that
it has never been raised before. It will be observed that the dictum
reserves the possibility that a retroactive application of law may in a
particular case be contrary to some provision of the Constitution.

b. Income Tax Cases
In Brushaber v. Union Pacific Rail1-oad 51 the Supreme Court held
that a federal income tax law enacted October 3, 1913, taxing income
earned after March 1, 1913, was not contrary to the due process clause
49

lbid., at 331 {italics added).
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 30 S. Ct. 190 (1910).
For additional cases, see STIMSON, JURISDICTION AND POWER OF TAXATION 70, note
I 61 ( 1933) •
61
240 u. s. 1, 36 s. Ct. 236 (1916).
50
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of the Fifth Amendment. The case was decided solely on the authority
of Stockdale v. The Insurance Companies/ 2 although as indicated above
the point was not considered in that case. Cases decided after 19 l 3 are
in accord.5 8 They are all based on the dictum in Stockdale v. The Insurance Companie;. Welch v. Henry/ 4 decided in 1938, holds, three justices dissenting, that a retroactive state income tax law is not prohibited
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case a
statute 55 enacted in 1935 was applied to income earned in 1933. In all
the other cases in which retroactive income tax laws were held consistent
with due process, the law was retroactive only to the beginning of the
year in which it was enacted.
In Welch v. Henry 56 the income tax cases were distinguished
from the inheritance tax cases 57 on the ground that the taxpayer had
done no voluntary act which he might have refrained from doing had
he anticipated the tax. 58 Justice Stone said that it could not be assumed
that stockholders would refuse to receive corporate dividends even if
they knew that their receipt would later be subjected to a new tax or to
the increase of an old one. 59 This seems to put the income tax decisions
upon the ground that the taxpayers were not shown to have changed
their positions in reliance upon the tax law in force during the year
when the income was earned. It is true that there were no facts showing
112

20 Wall. (87 U. S.) 323 (1873).
Lynch v. Homby, 247 U. S. 339, 38 S. Ct. 543 (1918); Reinecke v. Smith,
289 U. S. 172, 53 S. Ct. 570 (1933); Cooper v. United States, 280 U. S. 409,
50 S. Ct. 164 (1930).
5
~ 305 U. S. 134, 59 S. Ct. 121 (1938), rehearing denied 305 U. S. 675,
59 S. Ct. 250 (1938). See also Graves v. People of the State of New York ex rel.
O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 59 S. Ct. 595 (1939).
55
Wis. Laws (1935), c. 15, § 6.
116
305 U. S. 134 at 147, 59 S. Ct. 121 (1938).
57
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 48 S. Ct. 105 (1927), modified 276
U. S. 594, 48 S. Ct. 105 (1928); Untermeyer v. Anderson, 276 U. S. 440, 48
S. Ct. 353 (1928); Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 51 S. Ct. 306 (1931).
118
"In the cases in which this Court has held invalid the taxation of gifts made and
completely vested before the enactment of the taxing statute, decision was rested on
the ground that the nature or amount of the tax could not reasonably have been anticipated by the taxpayer at the time of the particular voluntary act which the statute
later made the taxable event. • •• Since, in each of these cases, the donor might freely
have chosen to give or not to give, the taxation, after the choice was made, of a gift
which he might well have refrained from making had he anticipated the tax, was
thought to be so arbitrary and oppressive as to be a denial of due process. But there are
other forms of taxation whose retroactive imposition cannot be said to be similarly
offensive, because their incidence is not on the voluntary act of the taxpayers." Welch
v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 at 147, 59 S. Ct. 121 (1938).
119
Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134 at 148, 59 S. Ct. 121 (1938)
58
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a change of position in the income tax cases. Nevertheless the probability that these taxpayers had changed their position relying on the
law in force at the time the income was earned is great. This is especially true where the statute taxes income earned several years before
its enactment. Income earned then may have been spent and there may
be nothing with which to pay the tax, or assets may have to be sacrificed in order to obtain the cash. In any case expenditures and commitments will have been made relying upon the surplus above the amount
necessary to pay taxes under existing law. Such changes of position may
occur where the statute is retroactive only to the beginning of the year
in which it was enacted. In view of these probabilities, such a change
of position should be presumed. This would operate in favor of the
taxpayer by putting the burden of proving the contrary upon the
government. This would not hamper the government in securing
revenue because there is no limit upon the rate which it may impose
prospectively.
c. Other Cases
In League v. Texas 60 a Texas statute provided for the collection
by suit in the courts of delinquent real property taxes, plus costs and
interest from the time they became delinquent. Before this statute
was enacted the method of collecting delinquent taxes on real estate
was by an administrative sale of the property with a right in the taxpayer to redeem the property within two years after the sale. Suit was
brought under the new statutory procedure to collect taxes, delinquent
at the time when the statute was enacted, on real estate already sold
under the old procedure. The effect of this was to reduce the time
allowed the taxpayer to pay the taxes, which had formerly included the
two-year redemption period. It also imposed interest for the period
before the law was passed during which taxes were delinquent. The
Supreme Court held that application of the statute to taxes already
delinquent was not prohibited by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Brewer said that a new remedy could be
applied to the collection of taxes without violating the Constitution.
This assumes that the remedy can be changed without affecting the
right, which is not true. Right and remedy are merely aspects of the
law. A legal right is no greater than the legal remedies for enforcing it.
New remedies add new rights just as they did under the old writ
system in England. They also reduce the rights, privileges and immunities of those against whom the remedies are given.
60

184 U. S. 1564 22 S. Ct. 475 (1902).
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That part of the opinion which deals with the retroactive imposition of interest is not clear. In one place Justice Brewer says: "This is
adding no novel or extraordinary penalty, for interest is the ordinary
incident to the non-payment of obligations." 61 Here Justice Brewer
seems to assume that the taxpayer was obligated to pay interest under
the law in force at the time the taxes become delinquent. This was not
the case.
Justice Brewer refers with approval to statements in the opinions
of cases decided before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted that
the only constitutional limitation upon retroactive laws was the limitation on retroactive criminal laws in the ex post facto clause and the
limitation on retroactive laws which interfered with the obligation of
contracts. These statements have not been the law since E ttor v.
Tacoma 62 was decided in 1913. In Citizens National Bank v. Commowwealth of Kentucky to the Use of Boyle County 63 a state statute
attempting to tax bank shares was held invalid on the ground that it
was a tax on the bank. Subsequently in 1903 a new statute imposing the
tax on the shares was made retroactive to 1892 in order to cover the
years during which the invalid statute was in force. The Supreme
Court held that the retroactive application of the law was not prohibited by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, on
the ground that the shares were subject to taxation already as property
and the statute merely provided another remedy for collecting the tax.
While the shares may have been subject to taxation in the sense that
the state could have imposed a prospective tax upon them without
violating the Constitution, they were not subject to taxation in the
sense that they were taxable under existing law during the years before
1903. The statute was applied retroactively to tax stock for each of
the eleven years prior to its enactment. The question whether or not
this can be done is similar to the one considered in the income tax
cases.8 '
In Billings v. United States 85 a federal tax on the use of foreignbuilt yachts was enacted August 5, 1909, effective August 6, 1909 and
payable September 1, 1909. It was applied to a yacht admittedly used
during the year prior to September 1, 1909. The United States
Supreme Court held that its application was consistent with the due
11

Ibid., 184 U. S. 156 at 162.
228 U.S. 148, 33 S. Ct. 428 (1913), discussed supra at note 15.
u 217 U.S. 443, 30 S. Ct. 532 (1910).
8
' See supra, subdivisions beginning at notes 48 and 5 l, respectively.
45
232 U. S. 261, 34 S. Ct. 421 (1914).
82

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW .

[ Vol. 38

process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The result seems right because
the application of the statute was not necessarily retroactive. A single
use of the yacht would subject the owner to the tax, and under the
admission the yacht may have been used between August 6, 1909 and
September ·1, 1909, that is, after the law was passed. In a number of
cases the Supreme Court has held that statutes were not applied retroactively although they were alleged to have violated due process
of law in this way. 66 However, in this case, Chief Justice White said:
"Again let it be conceded that the causing the tax for the annual
period to become due September 1, 1909 [ instead of September
1, 1910], is to give it in some respects a retroactive effect, such
concession does not cause the act to be beyond the power of Congress under the Constitution to adopt." 67
The justice cited Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 68 which contains nothing to
support this statement. The question whether a statute may be applied
retroactively was not involved in that case. Chief Justice White also
said:
"It is also settled beyond dispute that the Constitution is not
self-destructive. In other words, that the powers which it confers
on the one hand it does not immediately take away on the other;
that is to say, that the authority to tax which is given in express
terms is not limited or restricted by the subsequent provisions of
the Constitution or the amendments thereto, especially by the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 69
Here the justice cited McCray v. United States,1° the oleomargarine
case. There is nothing in it to support Chief Justice White's extreme
statement. On the contrary in that case he himself says:
"Whilst undoubtedly both the Fifth and Tenth Amendment
qualify, in so far as they are applicable, all the provisions of the
Constitution, nothing in those amendments operates to take away
the grant of power to tax conferred by the Constitution upon Congress....
66

Steamship Co. v. Joliffe, 2 Wall. (69 U. S.) 450 (1864); Morley v. Lake
Shore & Michigan Southern Ry., 146 U. S. 162, 13 S. Ct. 54 (1892); Cahen \'".
Brewster, 203 U. S. 543, 27 S. Ct. 174 (1906); Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.,
278 U.S. 339, 49 S. Ct. 123 (1929); Gwinn v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
287 U. S. 224, 53 S. Ct. 157 (1932).
67
Billings v. United States, 232 U. S. 26r at 282, 34 S. Ct. 421 (1914).
68
220 U. S. 107, 31 S. Ct. 342 (1911).
69
Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261 at 282, 3.f. S. Ct. 42r (r914).
70
195 U. S. 27, 24 S. Ct. 769 (1904).

1 939]

RETROACTIVITY IN LAW

47

"The right of Congress to tax within its delegated power being
unrestrained, except as limited by the Constitution, it was within
the authority conferred on Congress to select the objects upon
which an excise should be laid." 71

B. RETROACTIVE DECISIONS
1. Case Holding Retroactive Application of Overruling
Decision Unconstitutional
In 1905 the United States Supreme Court decided Mu.hiker v.
New York & Harlem R. R. 12 Prior to 1888, when Muhlker purchased
the New York City real estate involved in this case, the New York
Court of Appeals had held in all of its decisions on the point that the
erection of an elevated railroad was not a public purpose or street use
within the meaning of a statute enacted in 1813 73 which declared that
the streets of New York City are held in trust by the city for certain
public purposes. In these cases it had held that the owner of real estate
had a right to light and air which was interfered with by the construction of an elevated railroad in the street in front of it and that for
such an interference the owner of real estate could recover damages in
an action against the railroad. The New York and Harlem Railroad
Company erected an elevated railroad in front of Muhlker's property.
Muhlker sued the railroad. The New York Court of Appeals reversed
its previous decisions and held that an elevated railroad was a public
or steet use within the statute and that the owner of real estate did not
have a right to light and air as against this use and therefore could not
recover damages. On appeal, however, the United States Supreme
Court held that the application of the new rule to Muhlker's property
acquired in reliance on the old decisions deprived him of his property
without due process of law. Justice McKenna said:
"plaintiff urges the contract clause of the Constitution of the
United States and the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . When the
plaintiff acquired his title those cases were the law of New York,
and assured to him that his easements of light and air were secured
by contract as expressed in those cases, and could not be taken from
him without payment of compensation. And this is the ground of
our decision. We are not called upon to discuss the power or the
limitations upon the power, of the courts of New York to declare
rules of property or change or modify their decisions, but only to 71

Ibid., 195 U. S. at 61.
197 U. S. 544, 25 S. Ct. 522 (1905).
73
The statute is not referred to in the opinion but in the brief by Elihu Root,
197 U. S. 544 at 549•
72
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decide that such power cannot be exercised to take away rights
which have been acquired by contract and have come under the
protection of the Constitution of the United States. And we determine for ourselves the existence and extent of such contract. This is
a truism; and when there is a diversity of state decisions the first
in time may constitute the obligation of contract and the measure
of rights under it. Hence the importance of the elevated railroad
cases and the doctrine they had pronounced when the plaintiff
acquired his property. He bought under their assurance, and that
these decisions might have been different or that the plaintiff
might have balanced the chances of the commercial advantage
between the right to have the street remain open and the expectation that it would remain open is too intangible to estimate." 14

It is unfortunate that Justice McKenna talks so much about contract.
Muhlker's rights were not contract rights, as McKenna recognizes
in speaking of the "title" which plaintiff acquired when the overruled
decisions were law and of "rights acquired by contract" instead of
contract rights. The gist of his reasoning is that the overruling decision
cannot be applied retroactively to deprive a person of rights which he
has acquired in reliance on existing law unless compensation is paid
therefor. The rights referred to are all rights, not merely contract
rights. He says that these rights are protected by the Constitution of the
United States. Since the Fourteenth Amendment was urged by plaintiff, the decision must be considered to be at least partly based upon that
clause. It cannot be supported as a decision based upon the contract
clause because (I) the rights involved were not contract rights and
( 2) the contract clause applies only to statutes and the statute involved
was enacted before Muhlker acquired his title.15
In making this decision the Court was influenced by its decision in
Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque.16 In that case an Iowa statute authorized
municipalities to issue bonds to be exchanged for the stock of railroad
companies to encourage the construction of railroads. In several decisions the Iowa Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute. After the city of Dubuque had issued bonds for the authorized
purpose, the Iowa Supreme Court, reversing its previous decisions, held
'14- Muhlker v. New York & H. R. R., 197 U. S. 544 at 562, 570-571, 25 S. Ct.
522 (1905).
15
Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103, 16 S. Ct. 80 (1895), considered
infra at note 84; Moore-Mansfield Construction Co. v. Electrical Installation Co., 234
U.S. 619, 34 S. Ct. 941 (1914); Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. (77 U.S.}
5II (1870).
715
l Wall. (68 u. S.) 175 (1863).
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that the statute violated provisions of the state constitution and was
invalid. The holder of the bonds sued in a federal district court under
the diversity of citizenship clause to recover money due on interest
coupons. The district court, applying the last decision, denied recovery.
It was reversed by the United States Supreme Court, which held that
the later case in Iowa should not be applied. Justice Swayne said:
"However we may regard the late case in Iowa as affecting the
future, it can have no effect upon the past.... To hold otherwise
would be as unjust as to hold that rights acquired under a statute
may be lost by its repeal." 77
In other decisions in cases brought in the federal courts under the
diversity of citizenship clause, the United States Supreme Court has
refused to apply the decisions of courts of the state whose law was
applicable when those decisions had been handed down after a party
had changed his position in reliance on earlier decisions thus overruled.78
While the constitutionality of the application of the overruling
decision was not involved in these cases, the Court held that the retroactive application of the overruling decision would be unfair and unjust
when the bonds had been purchased in reliance on the decisions overruled. Since due process is merely elemental fairness and justice, it
would seem that the result in these cases was required by the Fourteenth Amendment just as the Court held in Muhlker v. New York
& Harlem R. R.19
Justice Holmes, who dissented in the Muhlker case, objected to the
extention of the doctrine of Gelpcke v. Dubuque 80 on the ground that
that decision was not well understood by the Supreme Court itself and
was not based on the contract clause.81 He also said that the decision of
the majority meant that "all property owners in a State have a vested
77 Ibid., at page 206.
78 The cases are cited in note

1, supra.
197 U. S. 544, 25 S. Ct. 522 (1905).
80
I Wall. {68 U. S.) 175 (1863), considered at note 76, supra.
81 "In other words, we are asked to extend to the present case the principle of
Gelpcke v. Dubuque [1 Wall. {68 U. S.) 175 (1863)], and Louisiana v. Pilsbury
[105 U.S. 278 {1881)], as to public bonds bought on the faith of a decision that
they were constitutionally issued. That seems to me a great, unwarranted and undesirable
extension of a doctrine which it took this court a good while to explain. The doctrine
now is explained, however, not to mean that a change in the decision impairs the
obligation of contracts••••" Muhlker v. New York & H. R. R., 197 U. S. 544 at
573-574, 25 S. Ct. 522 (1905), citing Birgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20 at 34,
z S. Ct. IO (1882), and Stanly County v. Coler, 190 U. S. 437 at 444-445, 23 S.
Ct. Sn (1903).
79
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right that no general proposition of law shall be reversed, changed or
modified by the courts if the consequence to them will be more or less
pecuniary loss." 62 However, Justice Holmes overlooked the essential
requirement of a change of position in reliance on existing decisions
and the possibility of applying the overruling decision prospectively.
In support of his views he cited Central Land Company v. Laidley.68
While the principle of Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R. R. seems
sound, the facts of that case afford some justification for the dissent.
Muhlker's reliance on the overruled decisions was inferred from the
fact, judicially noticed, that there were a great many of these decisions
over a long period of time. There was no direct evidenc!! of reliance.
2.

Line of Decisions Sustaining Retroactive
Application of O'Verruling Decisions

Central Land Co. 'V. Laidley 84 was decided by the United States
Supreme Court in 1895, before it decided Muhlker 'V. New York &
Harlem R. R. The validity of a married woman's deed to West
Virginia land was in question. The West Virginia court, construing a
statute, decided that the deed was invalid and that a later deed to
Laidley conveyed the title. The Central Land Company appealed to
the United States Supreme Court on the ground that this interpretation
marked a departure from the decisions in force when the deed was
delivered. It claimed that the retroactive application of the new construction was unconstitutional in that it (I) impaired the obligation
of contract and ( 2) deprived the company of its property without due
process of law. The Court held that the retroactive application of the
new construction was not prohibited by the Constitution. Justice Gray
said that article I, paragraph 10, applied only to statutes and not to
decisions of courts. This is unquestionably sound. 85 Concerning the
Fourteenth Amendment he said:
"When the parties have been fully heard in the regular course
of judicial proceedings, an erroneous decision of a state court does
not deprive the unsuccessful party of his property without due
process of law, within the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." 86
82
Muhlker v. New York & H. R. R., 197 U. S. 544 at 574, 25 S. Ct. 522
(1905).
83
159 U.S. 103, 16 S. Ct. 80 (1895), considered infra at note 84.
84
159 U.S. 103, 16 S. Ct. 80 (1895).
85
See the cases considered in note 96, infra.
86
Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 at u2, 16 S. Ct. 80 (1895).
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It is submitted that Central Land Co. v. Laidley is wrongly decided. It is not a case where the retroactive application of the overruling decision would be perfectly fair and just, like some cases involving the retroactive application of statutes. 87 Apparently no such cases
have been brought to the United States Supreme Court. Here the retroactive application of the overruling decision deprives a person of
property acquired in reliance on the decisions overruled. The retroactive application of a statute to deprive a person of rights acquired
in reliance on statutes repealed by the new law is held to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. 88 The effect of an overruling decision is the same. The due process clauses apply to courts 8 ~
as well as to Congress and the legislatures. They require elemental
fairness in substance 90 as well as in procedure. Justice Gray's statement
may be true as a general proposition, but the evil complained of here
is not merely error about which there may be a difference of opinion
but the obvious unfairness or arbitrariness of the retroactive application
of an overruling decision to deprive a person of property acquired in
reliance on the decisions overruled. The cases which he cites 91 are not in
point upon this question.
It is fair to conclude that Central Land Co. v. Laidley was impliedly overruled by Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R. R. Nevertheless the Court in subsequent decisions has followed Central Land Co.
v. Laidley. It did so in Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General 92 and Dunbar v. City of New York 93 without citing the Muhlker
case at all. In Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan 94 the M-uhlker case is treated
as though it was based solely on the contract clause. The overruling
decision changing the construction of the statute in that case was said
to be an application of the statute prohibited by the contract clause.
Chief Justice Taft did not explain how a statute enacted seventy-five
years before Muhlker acquired title could impair his rights. In Flem87

See the subdivision beginning supra, at note 2 5.
8ee the subdivision beginning supra, at note 14.
89
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 50 S. Ct. 451
(1930), considered infra at note 102.
90
Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Kentucky, 188 U. S. 385, 23 S. Ct.
463 (1903), and cases cited in STIMSON, JURISDICTION AND PowER OF TAXATION
4, note 9 (1933).
91
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90 (1875); Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., u3
U. S. 9, 5 S. Ct. 441 (1885); Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. Ry., 146 U. S. 162,
13 S. Ct. 54 (1892); Bergemann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655, 15 S. Ct. 727 (1895).
92
205 U.S. 454 at 460, 27 S. Ct. 556 (1907).
93
251 U.S. 516, 40 S. Ct. 250 (1920).
9
~ 263 U.S. 444, 44 S.Ct. 197 (1924).
88
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95

the only claim was that the application of the decision, overruling decisions construing a statute which were in force and
relied upon at the time that the partnership was formed, impaired
the obligation of contract. 96 Counsel argued that the overruling decision
construing the statute was an application of the statute prohibited by
the contract clause. Chief Justice Taft, who again wrote the opinion,
remained consistent with himself by agreeing, but said that the statute
was one and the same law from the time it was enacted, and that being
in force when the partnership was formed it could not be treated as a
subsequent statute applied retroactively. He remained consistent with
his explanation of the Muhlker case but reached a result contrary to it.
Since the contract clause applies only to statutes, it would seem that it
has no application in cases where the statute was enacted before the
rights claimed to have been impaired were acquired. 97 A deprivation
of rights resulting from a subsequent change of construction is unquestionably the work of the courts. If so, the Fleming case reaches the
right result because only the contract clause was relied upon and the
only sound basis for the Muhlker case, as previously indicated/ 8 is the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan,9 9 earlier cases such as Gelpcke v.
City of Dubuque 100 and similar decisions were explained as coming up
from the lower federal courts which acquired jurisdiction under the
diversity of citizenship clau_se and as not based on any provision of the
Constitution. This is correct. Chief Justice Taft said that the state
98

264 U.S. 29, 44 S. Ct. 246 (1924).
In several cases counsel have relied upon the contract clause. In Railroad Co.
v. McClure, IO Wall. (77 U. S.) 5n (1870), the Court held that the retroactive
application of an overruling decision construing a state constitutional provision did not
violate the contract clause because the state constitutional provision was in existence
before the bonds were acquired in reliance on the decisions overruled. In Louisiana v.
Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278 (1881), the retroactive application of an overruling decision
was held to be a violation of the contract clause. In Moore-Mansfield Construction Co.
v. Electrical Installation Co., 234 U. S. 619, 34 S. Ct. 941 (1914), the retroactive
application of an overruling decision construing a statute was held not t~ violate the
contract clause because the contract clause applies only to statutes and not to judicial
decisions. It is submitted that this is the sound view. See the discussion at note 84,
supra, of Ceneral Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103, 16 S. Ct. So (1895), and the
discussion of the ex post facto clause at the beginning of this article. It is the same
clause, Art. I, § IO.
97
·
Moore-Mansfield Construction Co. v. Electrical Installation Co., 234 U. S.
619, 34 S. Ct. 941 (1914), and Railroad Co. v. McClure, IO Wall. (77 U. S.) 5II
(1870).
98
Supra, note 72 et seq.
.
89
263 U.S. 444, 44 S. Ct. 197 (1924), considered at note 94;supra.
100
I Wall. (68 U. S.) 175 (1863).
98
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decisions were usually followed but that "where gross injustice would
be otherwise done, they followed the earlier rather than the later
decisions as to what it was." 101 Do not the due process clauses protect
against gross injustice?

3. Distinction between Retroactivity as to. Procedure and
as to Substance in Applying Due Process
In Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill,102 the bank
brought a bill in equity in a Missouri court to recover twenty-five per
cent of a tax on bank stock on the ground that it was assessed at full
value while other property was assessed at seventy-five per cent of its
value. At the time that the action was brought, decisions of the Supreme
Court of Missouri were in force construing a state statute not to give
the state tax commission authority to make an adjustment and holding
that a bill in equity was the proper procedure. In this case the Missouri
Supreme Court reversed these decisions, holding that there was no
jurisdiction in equity because the remedy at law by application to the
state tax commission was adequate. Under the new interpretation
the application to the tax commission could not be made after the tax
books were delivered to the collector, which in this case had occurred
before the decision. The bank, relying on the decisions overruled, had
lost its opportunity to apply to the tax commission and the overruling
decision deprived it of the customary remedy in equity and consequently
of its right to have the adjustment. The United States Supreme Court
held that the retroactive application of the overruling decision was
prohibited by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Justice Brandeis distinguished Central Land Co. v. Laidley 101
on the ground that there the application of the overruling decision
deprived the land company of its substantive right only, while in this
case it deprived the bank of its opportunity to be heard, which was a
denial of due process in its primary or procedural sense.10' Just why the
denial of an opportunity to be heard is considered the only kind of
101

Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U. S. 444 at 452, 44 S. Ct. 197 (1924).
281 U.S. 673, 50S. Ct. 451 (1930).
108
159 U.S. 103, 16 S. Ct. So (1895), discussed at note 84, supra.
lM " • • • the mere fact that a state court has rendered an erroneous decision on a
question of state law, or has overruled principles or doctrines established by previous
decisions on which a party relied, does not give rise to a claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment or otherwise confer appellate jurisdiction on this Court. But our decision
in the case at bar is not based on the ground that there is a retrospective denial of the
existence of any right or a retroactive change in the law of remedies. We are not now
concerned with the rights of the plaintiff on the merits••••" Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust
& Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673 at 680-681, 50 S. Ct. 451 (1930).
102
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arbitrary action is not explained. Justice Brandeis points out that the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation upon
state courts as well as legislatures and administrative officers,105 but
does not explain why the limitation upon courts should be procedural
only while upon legislatures it is both substantive 106 and procedural.
It is submitted that the distinction is untenable. If the retroactive application of a statute to deprive a person of a substantive right acquired
in reliance on existing law is not consistent with due process, the same
should be true of the retroactive application of an overruling decision.
However, the Hill decision is sound and it may be the beginning of a
return to the rule established in Muhlker v. New York & Harlem
R. R.101 This case was not referred to in the opinion.108

4. Refusal to Apply Overruling Decision Retroactively as
Denial of Due Process
In Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co.,1° 9 the
Supreme Court of Montana, construing a state statute authorizing the
Board of Railroad Commissioners to fix intrastate rates, had held that
the rates fixed by the commission under the statute were tentative,
subject to change on application to the commission if found to be
unreasonable, and that the altered rate could be applied retroactively
to intervening shipments. Subsequently the Sunburst Oil & Refining
Co. shipped crude petroleum distillate over the Great Northern Railway paying the rate fixed by the commission. It applied to the commission for a change in the rate, claiming that the existing rate was excessive and unreasonable because based upon an estimated weight of
7.4 pounds per gallon whereas the actual weight was not more than 6.6
pounds per gallon. The commission sustained its claim and fixed a
lower rate. Suit was then brought against the railway to recover the
amount paid in excess of that required by the new rate. The Supreme
Ibid., 281 U. S. 673 at 680.
Supra, note 14 et seq.
101
197 U. S. 544, 25 S. Ct. 522 (1905).
108
In Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co. v. State of Wisconsin ex rel. City
of Milwaukee, 252 U. S. 100 at 106, 50 S. Ct. 306 (1920), Justice Brandeis said:
~'Unlike Gelpcke v. Dubuque [1 Wall. (68 U. S.) 175 (1863)] and Muhlker v.
New York & H. R.R. [197 U.S. 544, 25 S. Ct. 522 (1905)], where protection
was afforded to rights acquired on the faith of decisions later overruled•.••" By this
statement he admits that in the Muhlker case substantive rights were given constitutional
protection against the retroactive application of an overruling decision when those
rights were acquired in reliance on existing law.
100
287 U. S. 358, 53 S. Ct. 145 ( 1932) ·
lOG
106
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Court of Montana, overruling its earlier decision, held that the rates
fixed were final for shipments made while they were in force, new
rates operating only prospectively. However, it refused to apply the
overruling decision, that is, the new construction, retroactively to the
past transactions in the case before it, declaring that it should apply
only in the future. The commission's new rate was applied retroactively
and recovery of the amount paid in excess of the sum required by that
rate allowed. The railway, relying upon the Fourteenth Amendment,
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States claiming that the
decision deprived it of property without due process of law in (I)
applying the new rate retroactively and ( 2) refusing to apply the
overruling decision or new construction retroactively. The Court held
that the decision was not contrary to due process.
In regard to the first point, Justice Cardozo said that the previous
decision of the Supreme Court of Montana had given notice to the
parties at the time that the shipments were made that the rates were
tentative and subject to retroactive alteration. It follows that neither
party could have changed its position in reliance upon an unalterable
rate, so that the retroactive application of the new rate was in no way
unfair or unjust.110
The contention that the refusal to apply the overruling decision
retroactively was a violation of due process was regarded as novel.
Justice Cardozo said that it was unnecessary to choose between different
theories of law,111 since the effect of the decision upon the parties was
the same as if the earlier decision had not been overruled, in which case
of course there would be no violation of due process. The result seems
to be right, because the rule of tentativeness was the rule upon which the
oil company relied when it paid. A retroactive application of the new rule
would have been unfair to it. Nevertheless the contention should not
be regarded as novel or far fetched. In a case where prior decisions are
overruled because the rule applied in them is regarded as productive
of injustice, a refusal to apply the new and just rule retroactively when
11

°Cf. cases discussed supra at note 25 et seq.

111

The conflicting theories which he refused to consider were the theory that
the overruled decisions were never law (the principle of the new decision having
always been the law) and the theory that decisions are law until they are overruled
and therefore apply to conduct in the interim. The writer's suggestion is that the truth
lies between these two extremes and that the rule of the overruled decisions is law
applicable to prior transactions only where a party has changed his position in reliance
upon it. Stimson, "Swift v. Tyson-What Remains?" 24 CoRN. L. Q. 54 at 69 et seq.

(1938).
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neither party has relied upon the old would seem to be arbitrary, unfair
and contrary to due process.112 In the S1mburst case the new rule was
not more just than the old. It was merely a different method of adjusting rates, legislative instead of judicial.
CONCLUSION

The retroactive application of criminal statutes is prohibited by the
ex post facto clause. Retroactive application of civil statutes is prohibited
by the due process clauses in cases where a party has changed his position in reliance on existing law. Nichols v. Coolidge 118 and the gift tax
cases decided on the authority of that decision seem to be an erroneous
application of this principle because the Court was mistaken in thinking
that the statute was applied retroactively. They should be overruled.
League v. Texas 11 should be overruled because inconsistent with the
above principle. The income tax cases and Citizens National Bank v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky 115 should also be overruled because taxpayers customarily make their fiscal arrangements in reliance on existing tax laws. Where there has been no change of position in reliance
upon existing law, retroactive application of a statute is not unconstitutional.
·
Th~re is a conflict in the United States Supreme Court decisions on
the question whether the retroactive application of an overruling decision to one who changed his position in reliance upon the decisions
overruled is contrary to due process of law. Muhlker v. New York &
Harlem R. R.,116 holding that the Constitution prohibits the retroactive
application of an overruling decision in such cases, should be followed.
Central Land Co. v. LaUley,111 Dunbar v. City of New York 118 and
Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan 110 should be overruled. Where there has
been no change of position in reliance upon existing decisions, the
retroactive application of a decision overruling them would seem not
to be unconstitutional.120
4,

112
. But see Milwaukee Electric Railway & Light Co. v. State of Wisconsin ex rel.
City of Milwaukee, 252 U. S. 100 at 105-106, 40 S. Ct. 306 (1920).
115
274 U.S. 531, 47 S. Ct. 710 (1927), discussed supra at note 18.
l1' 184 U.S. 156, 22 S. Ct. 475 (1902), discussed supra at note 60.
118
217 U.S. 443, 30 S. Ct. 532 (1910), discussed supra at note 63.
ltG 197 U.S. 544, 25 S. Ct. 523 (1905), discussed supra at note 72.
117
159 U.S. 103, 16 S. Ct. So (1895), discussed supra at note 84..
1111
251 U.S. 516, 40 S. Ct. 250 (1920).
119
263 U.S. 444, 44 S. Ct. 197 (1924), discussed supra at note 94.
120
See O'Neil v. Northern Colorado Irrigation Co., 242 U. S. 20, 37 S. Ct.
7 (1916), where a state court decision construing a statute where two constructions were
possible was held not to be a violation of due process. Cf. the decisions sustaining the
retroactive application of statutes, supra, note 25 et seq. See also Stimson, "Swift v.
Tyson-What Remains?" 24 CoRN. L. Q. 54 at 69-73 (1938).

